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Summary 
In this paper we investigate the choice of FDI versus joint-venture, made by Italian, 
Spanish and Swiss multinationals in China, as shaped by the risk of Dissipation of 
Intangible Assets. Probit estimates, based on an entirely new firm-level dataset, 
constructed by the author, show that FDI is more likely to emerge when know-how 
easily spills over - namely for firms endowed with more Intangible Assets or belonging 
to high tech sectors -  in line with the theoretical expectations. 
 
Keywords: Intangible Assets, Internalisation, FDI, Joint-venture, China 
 
JEL Classification: F23, C25, O53 
 
I am grateful to Luisella Balestra, Carlo Filippini, Andrea Fosfuri, Gianmarco 
Ottaviano, Stefan Francini and Sara Ugolini, for helpful comments and assistance in 
data collection. This paper is part of the project “FDI and Internalisation in Asia: 
Evidence from Italy and Spain”; financial support from Bocconi University (Ricerca di 


















Address for correspondence: 
 
Valeria Gattai 
Bocconi University and ISESAO 
Via Salasco 5, stanza 4 
20136 Milano 
Italy 
Phone: +39 02 5836 3313 
























GDP growth rate above 8%, huge market dimension, low cost labour force and a 
population close to one billion and three hundred thousand inhabitants are just some of 
the reasons that make the People’s Republic of China (PRC) enormously attractive for 
production de-localization.  
China has grown quite fast since 1978, when the Open Door Policy, promoted by Deng 
Xiaoping, ushered in a new era of modernization and growth. The transition from a 
planned to a market economy has resulted in fast development, structural changes and 
lifestyle improvements, which created new opportunities for Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and made China the largest recipient of FDI since 2003. 
   2
This paper tells the tale of three countries - Italy, Spain and Switzerland – and analyses 
the manufacturing operations of their multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the PRC. For 
the purpose the present work, we have built an entirely new firm-level dataset, through 
survey interviews; indeed a multiple choice questionnaire has been sent to the whole 
population of Italian, Spanish and Swiss MNEs with manufacturing affiliates in China. 
With a reply rate around 80% of the total, our database documents the experience of 165 
parent companies with more than 200 FDIs
1 and joint-ventures in the PRC. 
The aim of this study is twofold:  first, we provide the reader with a basic overview of the 
survey, to draw a detailed profile of the actors and comment on their strategic choices; 
second, we focus more specifically on the entry mode decision of Italian, Spanish and 
Swiss multinationals in China and regress the joint-venture / FDI trade-off on a number of 
firm, industry and country characteristics, explored through the questionnaire.  In 
particular, we are interested is showing whether the risk of Dissipation of Intangible Asset 
(DIA) plays any role in orienting such a trade-off. 
Intangible Assets (IAs) may consist either in product quality reputation or superior 
knowledge; compared to physical assets, they are more likely to give rise to FDI because 
they can be easily transferred back and forth and they enjoy a “public good” nature, being 
available to additional production facilities at relatively low costs (Markusen 1995). 
Nevertheless, the same joint-ness feature that makes it easy to employ IAs abroad, 
exposes the MNE to the risk of dissipating its crucial resources, if shared with local firms. 
So, the Internalisation issue - namely the choice of FDI versus relying on a local supplier 
– has been explained by a trade-off between preventing IAs spillover - through FDI, since 
production takes place in a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) – and benefiting from the 
local firms’ familiarity with their own country, achieved through a partnership (Ethier and 
Markusen 1996; Markusen 1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 
2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a). 
Our empirical findings are in lines with these theoretical predictions: Italian, Spanish and 
Swiss multinationals are more likely to invest directly in China, the higher their level of 
precious resources. 
                                                 
1 Notice that, throughout paper, we restrict the label of Foreign Direct Investment to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, to denote the case of total ownership, as opposed to the partial one, typical of joint-ventures; 
the term MNE is instead referred to firms engaged in international operations of any kind, from FDI to 
licensing and joint-venture.   3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we present a brief literature 
review regarding the theoretical background; Section 3 is entirely dedicated to the 
empirical analysis: data description (3.1), methodology (3.2) and Probit estimates (3.3); 
Section 4 concludes and sets future lines of research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In the last 20 years, the economic literature on Multinational Enterprises has basically 
developed around Dunning’s OLI framework, considering Ownership,  Location and 
Internalisation advantages as an explanation of Foreign Direct Investment (Dunning 
1993). 
If MNEs were exactly identical to domestic firms, they would not find it profitable to 
enter the domestic market; since FDI indeed exist, it must be the case that multinational 
firms possess some kind of advantage easily exploitable through direct investment. 
Ownership advantages refer to some product, know-how, reputation or production 
process, to which other firms do not have access. Location advantages crop up when 
producing locally implies fewer costs than servicing the domestic market via export. 
Internalisation advantages arise when key resources are better exploited if kept within the 
boundaries of the multinational firm. 
For the purpose of the present paper, we are particularly interested in the Internalisation 
issue
2; economic theories about it can be grouped into three different approaches, which 
we call: 1) Theory of the Firm; 2) Agency Costs and 3) Dissipation of Intangible Asset. 
The first view embraces recent contributions in which the boundaries of a Multinational 
Enterprise are assessed through the opening up of the “black box” - traditionally explored 
by the theorists of the firm – and the simultaneous endogenization of the market 
environment – as in the International Economics tradition (see, among others: Grossman 
and Helpman 2002, 2003, 2004; Antras and Helpman 2004; Antras 2003; Feenstra and 
Hanson 2003, 2004; Ottaviano and Turrini 2003, Marin and Verdier 2002, 2003). 
The second approach - called Agency-Costs - focuses on the principal (MNE) / agent 
(local firm) problem deriving from potential diverging goals between the two parties. 
When designing an appropriate incentive scheme, to induce agent’s effort, becomes too 
costly for the multinational firm, it may opt for a wholly-owned subsidiary rather than 
relying on a local company (Horstmann and Markusen 1996). 
                                                 
2 For a survey, see Markusen 1995, Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, Saggi 2000.   4
The third explanation stems from the risk of Dissipation of Intangible Assets, namely 
reputation, related to the product quality and knowledge, characterized by some 
technology or managerial techniques.  
The term dissipation thus entails a different meaning, depending on the asset under 
consideration: in the case of knowledge, a spillover mechanism is likely to operate, 
making the local counterpart appropriate production secrets, copy final goods and 
eventually start a rival firm on the basis of  the “stolen” asset; in the case of reputation, 
dissipation comes because the local counterpart benefits from the MNE’s brand image, 
but  may not put any effort in maintaining and enhancing it.  
Irrespective of the asset involved, the main message that comes out from the DIA 
approach is that the risk of losing any of the firm’s key resources provides a motive for 
keeping production internal (FDI) rather than partnering with a local firm. 
In particular, Ethier and Markusen (1996) show, in a two-period model, that MNEs are 
more likely to choose Foreign Direct Investment, the more important the Intangible 
Assets, the lower the discount factor, the larger the wage gap between the source and the 
host country and the more concentrated the recipient market. 
In Fosfuri (2000), a firm endowed with a new technology has to choose among export, 
licensing and direct investment in order to serve a foreign market. Notice that the MNE 
can strategically use the vintage of its technology in order to deter imitation by the local 
firm; as a result, transfers to affiliates might be of later vintage relative to technologies 
sold to independent local firms. 
Mattoo et al. (2001) set up a model in which a foreign enterprise can choose between FDI 
and the acquisition of an existing domestic firm. Prohibitively high or particularly low 
technology transfer costs generate a divergence between the MNE and the local 
government most preferred mode of entry, while for intermediate levels, the preferences 
are aligned and there is no need for policy intervention.  
The debate on the effects of Foreign Direct Investments on the host country is at the core 
of  Markusen (1998, 2001)’s two-period model, where contract enforcement – in the form 
of IPR protection – is shown to influence FDI inflow to developing countries and host 
countries welfare. Differently from the other models, in which operating within firm’s 
boundaries provides a solution against asset dissipation, here the multinational may find it 
optimal to export, in order to protect its technology.    5
A similar view is taken in Fosfuri et al. (2001), where export comes without any 
knowledge dissipation, while FDI involves technology transfer through the training of a 
local worker. In particular, technological spillovers do not occur if the joint profit of the 
MNE plus the local firm is highest when the multinational can use the technology as a 
monopolist; moreover, a low level of absorptive capability by the local firm is shown to 
reduce the potential for FDI generating spillover. 
In Saggi (1996, 1999), the choice of integration, relative to licensing, is motivated by the 
wish to protect the MNE’s key resources not only in the domestic market, but in all the 
markets in which it potentially competes with a local firm, adding an element of novelty 
to the existing literature. As a result, FDI becomes a more preferable option if 
competition from a licensee in one market erodes the licensor’s profit in other markets, 
whereas licensing is chosen if competition can be prevented. 
This analysis is extended in Glass and Saggi (2002a) where the Internalisation issue is 
shown to play a role in determining the rate and magnitude of innovation.  Notice that the 
licensing contract, here, is characterized by profit sharing between the foreign and the 
local firm, rather than having the licensee paying a fee to the licensor and retaining total 
revenues. In taking the Internalisation decision, MNEs thus trade off the cost 
disadvantage of operating alone, with the profit retention by the local firm. When the 
mode choice is fixed, a subsidy to multinational production increases the rate, but 
decreases the size of innovation; when the mode can switch, the rate and level of 
innovation both increase, provided that the subsidy is not too large
3.  
To the best of our knowledge, theoretical studies on the boundaries of the Multinational 
Enterprise, inspired by the Dissipation of Intangible Asset, only consider export and 
licensing as an alternative to Foreign Direct Investment. 
However, given the broadly documented relevance of joint-ventures in China (see, for 
instance, Luo 2000; Li and Li 1999), in this paper we are rather interested in the 
comparison between total (FDI) and partial (JV) ownership, based on the risk of 
knowledge spillover. 
We believe that an extension of the DIA approach, to incorporate the joint-venture case, 
is quite reasonable: although licensing implies a more direct channel for technology 
transfer - because the licensor has to provide the licensee with the whole set of production 
                                                 
3 A different result is obtained in Glass and Saggi (2002b)’ product cycle model, stronger IPR protection – through the 
imitation disincentive and resource wasting effects – decreases both innovation and FDI,  because multinational firms 
feel more secure from imitation.   6
tools – working side by side in a joint-venture similarly allows the local firm to learn 
from the MNE, thus exposing it to the risk of losing key resources. A similar approach is 
followed in many empirical studies on the Internalisation issue (see, among others: 
Andersen and Gatignon 1986; Gomes Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Agarwal and 
Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1996; Buckley and Casson 1996; Smarzynska 2000; Desai et 
al. 2002) in which integrated production is shown to prevail, compared to JV, when the 
threat of spillover is high, namely for firms endowed with superior technology or 
operating in high tech sectors, resembling the theoretical findings on the FDI/licensing 
trade-off. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
In this Section, we empirically assess the choice of FDI versus joint-venture made by 
Italian, Spanish and Swiss multinationals in China.  
The discussion is organized in three steps: first we present the data (3.1) and the 
specification (3.2), and then we comment the econometric estimates (3.3) and their 
matching with the theoretical priors from Section 2. 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis, conducted between 2001 and 2005, builds on a survey 
questionnaire, exploring the international choices of 165 Italian, Spanish and Swiss 
manufacturing companies with 265 production affiliates in China.  
Although relatively small, we believe that this sample is highly representative, since it 
accounts for 80% of all Italian, Spanish and Swiss investors in the region of interest
4. 
The questionnaire, based on multiple choice responses, consists of two sections: first we 
ask background information to derive a general profile of the parent company; then we 
investigate the Internalisation issue and the major challenges faced in the destination 
country, for more than 40 questions overall. 
Additional balance sheet or industry-level data are derived from AIDA (Analisi 
Informatizzata delle Aziende), ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Stastistica), and AMADEUS. 
The experiences of European MNEs in the PRC are very diverse. An initial look at the 
survey results suggests that it is impossible to draw a single profile, because investors 
differ in many regards. 
                                                 
4 The complete list of investors was obtained through intersection of all the available sources: ICE (Istituto Commercio 
Estero), Reprint-Politecnico, Italian, Spanish and Swiss Embassies and Chambers of Commerce in China. In lines with 
the theoretical specification, attention was restricted to manufacturing operations.    7
Figure 1 displays the composition of the sample: Italy has a predominant position in 
China, with 78% of total affiliates, followed by Switzerland (13%) and Spain (9%). 
Figure 1: Composition of the sample 
 
According to their size, Swiss companies tend to be very large, with more than 500 
employees, while the Italian and Spanish investors are mainly small – 11-99 employees - 
and medium - 100-499 employees - enterprises (Figure 2).  
As far as sales are concerned, 45% top 50 million Euros, 15% is between 25 and 50 
million Euros and 21% below 10 million. 
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Based on the acquisition of technology, firms can be grouped in four categories of 
technological development (Bell and Pavitt 1993): in traditional “supplier dominated” 
industries – like textile, leather, shoes, furniture, potteries etc. – technical change comes 
from supplier of inputs, while technology is transferred in the form of capital goods and 
components; in “scale intensive” industries – like automobile and chemicals – technical 
change is generated by the design and operation of complex production systems; in 
“science based” high-tech industries, technology emerges from corporate R&D and it is 







provide high performance equipment in the form of components, instruments or software 
to advance users.   
Figure 3: Sector of the parent company 














From Figure 3, we see that the specialized supplier dominated sector is the most 
important for all the three nationalities, followed by the scale intensive in Switzerland, the 
supplier dominated in Italy and the science based in Spain. 
Interviews reveal that firms pay large attention at the human capital of their employees, as 
a key IA: many of them require English (70%) and computer (97%) skills to be held by 
the entire workforce of the parent company, while the percentage of employees holding a 
degree is higher than 25% in almost half of the cases. As far as training courses are 
concerned, we found out that they are organized for all the employees by 80% of the 
Swiss, 60% of the Spanish and 40% of the Italian companies. 
The international experience of European MNEs seems to be similar throughout the 
sample and noticeably elevated. Around 80% has had business activities – from import-
export to FDI and joint-venture, from licensing to franchising (2%) - in more than five 
countries, for longer then 10 years (76%), before the present involvement in the PRC. 
The decision to operate in China can be driven by a lot of purposes, from the huge market 
dimension to the low cost labour force, from the need to avoid tight competition or 
constrictive laws at home, to the wish to establish a commercial platform in Asia or to 
take a good chance
5. According to Figure 4, market seeking considerations played the 
major role, followed by a good chance for Spanish companies, and the low cost labour 
force for the Italian ones, while Swiss firms seemed to be equally interested in both 
dimensions. 
                                                 
5 A typical example of “good chance” is the event in which the European firm accidentally meets a partner for a joint-
venture during international expositions.   9
Figure 4: Investor’s purpose in establishing in China 












Adding to this, it is worth considering the destination of the goods produced in China:  
while Swiss firms export most of their production (87%), Spanish companies mainly 
attempt at satisfying local demand (57%)
6 and Italian enterprises locate middle way 
between the two extremes, both producing for the Chinese market (48%) and to export 
abroad (52%). 
Figure 5: Major problems crossed by our European investors in China 













Figure 5 summarizes the main problems faced by European MNEs in China, showing a 
good deal of variation across countries: while Italian investors have mostly suffered from 
cultural distance (25%), the Swiss have complained about the lack of good infrastructures 
(25%) and the Spanish about the complicacy of bureaucracy (31%). Linguistic difficulties 
and the absence of a clear and transparent legal system have been met quite often by all 
                                                 
6 Using the terminology of the Knowledge Capital Model (see Markusen and Maskus 2001 for a survey), we call 
vertical purpose the first case, aimed at saving on production costs – i.e. MNEs produce in the local market, because it 
is cheaper, but they sell abroad - and horizontal purpose the second one, aimed at accessing the local market – i.e. 
MNEs produce and sell within the local market.   10
the three. Notice that only a small percentage of enterprises have not complained at all, 
suggesting that operating in China is still far away from being simple and straight 
forward, from a Western perspective. 
For the purpose of the present work, it is particularly interesting to consider the mode of 
entry, selected by European respondents. Figure 6 displays our main findings: while 
Italian (66%) and Swiss (58%) dominating choice falls on the joint-venture option, the 
Spanish seem to have a strong preference towards total ownership (78%). 











Basing on the survey answers, the reasons to engage in a partnership, rather than 
operating in wholly-owned subsidiaries, range from gaining local support to risks and 
costs sharing, from achieving the optimal size to skills and competitive position 
enhancing (Figure 7). China is still perceived as a difficult and faraway destination, so 
that operating in a joint-venture seems to be the easiest way to survive and succeed there. 
Indeed, the need to find a partner, well acquainted with the domestic context, able to 
speak and negotiate with the Chinese suppliers and customers, and good in dialoguing 
with the local authorities is particularly stressed by Italian and Swiss respondents. 
Among the firms that operate in a WOS, a large majority chooses this mode in order to 
achieve strong control over technology transfer and high flexibility standards (see Figure 
8), in lines with our theoretical expectations: especially high tech companies are very 
reluctant to invest in developing countries since they do not want to share know-how with 
a lower skilled partner. Foreign Direct Investment seems the most natural way to avoid 
this risk, as MNEs simply work alone and they do not need to consult with a local 
counterpart on management decisions. For about 30%, the wholly-owned subsidiary   11
represents the evolution from a former JV
7, while 3% chooses to operate alone due to the 
lack of an appropriate local partner. This evidence seems to be consistent with our 
extension of the Dissipation of Intangible Assets framework: the wish to preserve 
technology and managerial techniques is stressed as a key driver of FDI, by European 
firms with manufacturing operations in China. 
Figure 7: Reasons to choice joint-venture over FDI 











Figure 8: Reasons to choice FDI over JV 
 










Based on the data, briefly presented in 3.1, we regress the Internalisation decision – FDI 
versus joint-venture – of Italian, Spanish and Swiss multinationals in China, within the 
DIA framework reviewed in Section 2.  
Our unit of analysis is the production affiliate in China. The econometric specification is 
as follows: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( nx kx nxk lx nxl mx nxm nx
C I F FDI ε σ τ α + + + =      
                                                 
7 Historically, the joint-venture represents the first contractual agreement that allows foreign property of 
Chinese firms (the Law on Equity Joint-Venture was approved in 1979). Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises were introduced only in the 1980s, making MNEs free to choose between partial and total 
ownership when investing in the PRC. Restrictions to such a choice, depending on the desired business or 
the sector have been completely abolished year by year (Cavalieri 2003).   12
FDI is the dependent variable vector, whose elements take value 1 in case of wholly-
owned subsidiary, 0 in case of joint-venture.  
Explanatory variables are of three types: F is a matrix of Firm-level regressors; I and C 
are, respectively, a matrix of Industry and Country characteristics; α, τ and σ are the 
parametric vectors associated to firm, industry and country variables and ε denotes the 
error term. 
Notice that, within F, it is worth distinguishing between core and control regressors: core 
variables are those measuring MNEs’ Intangible Assets, over which we have some 
expectations (see Section 2); control variables denote other firm-level characteristics that 
may play a role in shaping the Internalisation decision. 
Recall from our previous discussion (Sections 1 and 2) that knowledge covers both human 
capital and technological aspects, so our core regressors refer to both types. This is an 
important novelty, compared to the previous empirical literature: although human capital 
is often mentioned as a key asset, likely to orient multinational activity, it is rarely 
included in econometric tests, due to the lack of firm-level information. Here, as a proxy 
for human capital, two different indicators are adopted, such as the extent of the training 
courses, organized by the parent company, for its employees (TRAINING), and their level 
of education (GRADUATE). 
As far as technology is concerned, our measures include: the value of patents (PATENT); 
the ratio of patents over sales (PATENT/SALES) and, similarly to (Blomstrom et al. 1989; 
Smarzyinska 2000), whether or not the parent firm belongs to a high tech sector 
(HIGHTECH), with a particular focus on the TELECOM one
8; PATENT*HIGHTECH is a 
measure the value of patent, for firms belonging to HIGHTECH sectors. 
These variables strictly refer to the MNE’s Intangible Assets and therefore, based on the 
DIA framework, we expect an overall positive sign: FDI, induced by the threat of 
knowledge dissipation, is more likely to emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. 
when firms are endowed with more technology and human capital or they belong to high 
tech industries. 
Firm-level controls include: sales (SALES, as in Blomstrom and Zejan 1991; Meyer 1998; 
Smarzynska 2000); the number of employees (EMPLOY) and the destination of the goods 
produced in China (HFDI) – which allows us to distinguish between horizontal and 
                                                 
8 Notice that in earlier studies (see, among others: Desai et al. 2002; Smarzynska 2000) R&D expenditure is also 
 employed as a proxy for technology. Due to data missing we preferred to base on patents, at firm-level, while the R&D 
expenditure, at country-level, is included as a control (RDE).   13
vertical purposes; similarly to (Herrmann and Datta 2002; Guillen 2003), COUNTRIES is 
a proxy for the MNE’s experience in running foreign operations. 
Matrix  I  contains a few industry controls - such as METAL,  PRECISION,  SCALE 
INTENSIVE and HT SUPPLIER DOMINATED – while matrix C covers both home and 
host country characteristics. In particular, it includes the location of the affiliate in China 
(SHANGAI, JIANGSU, GUANGDONG and ZEHIJANG) - to capture the high degree of 
variation within the destination market; the location of the parent company in Europe 
(SPAIN); the level of Research & Development expenditure (RDE); the high tech exports, 
as percentage of total merchandise exports (HTE); and the dimension of the population 
(POP) in the home country, to take into account potential differences across Italian, 
Spanish and Swiss investors. 
Table 1 summarizes all the information about the variables described above. 
Given the binary nature of FDI, regressions are carried out within a Probit framework. 
Table 1: Variable description 
Variable  Description 
FDI  Dummy variable, 1 if FDI, 0 if JV. 
Type: regressand. 
Source: interviews. 
GRADUATE  Dummy variable, 1 if the percentage of employees with a 
degree is larger than 25%, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human 
capital of the parent firm. 
Source: interviews. 
TRAINING  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm organizes training 
courses for the employees longer than 6 months, 0 otherwise. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human 
capital of the parent firm. 
Source: interviews. 
HIGHTECH  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to a “high tech” 
sector, i.e. a sector in which the average R&D expenditure is 
more than 500,000 Euro. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of 
technology of the parent firm. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale 
di Statistica ) data.  
TELECOM  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the 
TELECOM (NACE REV 1.1, 32) sector, 0 otherwise.  
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of the level 
of technology of the parent firm.  
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data.   14
PATENT  Patents of the parent firm (millions Euro). 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of 
technology of the parent firm. 
Source: AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende, it is a 
dataset that comprises balance sheet information of more than 
200,000 Italian companies with sales lager than 500,000 
Euro) and AMADEUS. 
PATENT/SALES  Patent over sales of the parent firm. 
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of 
technology of the parent firm. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT, AIDA and 
AMADEUS. 
PATENT*HIGHTECH  Patents of the parent firm (millions Euro), belonging to   
HIGHTECH sectors.   
Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of 
technology of the parent firm. 
Source: Interviews, AIDA and AMADEUS. 
SALES  Sales of the parent company (billions Euro). 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: AIDA and AMADEUS. 
EMPLOY  Number of employees of the parent company. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: AIDA and AMADEUS. 
HFDI  Dummy variable, 1 in case of horizontal purpose – i.e. the 
goods produced in China are addressed to the local market – 
0 in case of vertical purpose – i.e. the goods produced in 
China are exported elsewhere. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews. 
COUNTRIES  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm was engaged in 
international operations with more than 5 foreign countries 
before the FDI in Asia, 0 otherwise. It is a proxy for the 
firm’s experience in running foreign operations. 
Type: firm-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews. 
METAL  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the METAL 
(NACE REV 1.1, 28) sector, 0 otherwise.  
Type: industry-level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
PRECISION  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the 
PRECISION (NACE REV 1.1, 33) sector, 0 otherwise.  
Type: industry -level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data. 
SCALE INTENSIVE  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm is engaged in the scale-
intensive sector, 0 otherwise (Bell and Pavitt 1993). 
Type: industry-level control regressor 
Source: interviews. 
HT SUPPLY DOMINATED  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm is a HIGHTECH 
company (see above definition) in supply dominated sector, 0 
otherwise (Bell and Pavitt 1993). 
Type: industry-level control regressor 
Source: interviews. 
SPAIN  Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm’s headquarter is located 
in Spain, 0 otherwise. 
Type: country-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews. 
SHANGHAI  Dummy variable, 1 if the subsidiary is located in Shanghai, 0 
otherwise. 
Type: country-level control regressor.   15
Source: interviews. 
JIANGSU  Dummy variable, 1 if the subsidiary is located in Jiangsu, 0 
otherwise. 
Type: country-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews. 
GUANGDONG  Dummy variable, 1 if the subsidiary is located in Guangdong, 
0 otherwise. 
Type: country-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews. 
ZEHIJANG  Dummy variable, 1 if the subsidiary is located in Zehijang, 0 
otherwise. 
Type: country-level control regressor. 
Source: interviews. 
POP  Population of the home country (millions of inhabitants). 
Type: country-level control regressor. 
Source: http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/ 
RDE  National Research and Development Expenditure of the home 
country, as a percentage of Gross National Income. 
Type: country-level control regressor. 
Source: personal elaborations from 
http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/ 
HTE  High Tech exports as a percentage of total merchandise 
exports of the European country. 
Type: country-level control regressor. 




Probit estimates are shown in Table 2. 
Reminding the theoretical priors, summarized in Section 2, it is worth noticing that all the 
core variables are significant with the expected sign and they remain so across different 
specifications; this provides a first important result and suggests quite a good matching 
between the theory and the data, making sense of our DIA extension to the case of joint-
venture. 
In particular, moving from the simplest specifications on the left – where FDI is regressed 
only on core-type variables – to the richer specifications on the right – where controls are 
also included - we see that with an increase in the European firms’ Intangible Assets, the 
probability of internalising production, rather than operating in joint-venture, increases as 
well.  
These results are broadly consistent with the existing empirical literature (see, among 
others, Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2001; Brouthers 2002; Chen and Hu 2002) and they 
add precious information about the role of human capital, as a key resource driving the 
Internalisation choice of Italian, Swiss and Spanish companies in China.  
The size of the parent company – measured by EMPLOY and SALES – does not turn 
significant in any specification.    16
Moreover, from Table 2, it seems that investors coming from Spain (SPAIN) are more 
prone to operate in wholly-owned subsidiaries, while experience in running foreign 
operations (COUNTRIES) and horizontal purpose (HFDI) push towards joint-venture 
establishment. Indeed, being used to manage foreign operations might help to protect 
Intangible Assets more effectively and to avoid the risk of knowledge dissipation. At the 
same time, it is clear that investors wishing to penetrate the local market – horizontal 
purpose - are more eager to do so in joint-venture, to take advantage of the partner 
knowledge of her own country.  
As far as industry variables are concerned, METAL and PRECISION turn out to be 
significant, with a positive sign, meaning that parent firms engaged with production of 
metal goods or precision instruments, watches and optical appliances have higher 
probability to operate through FDI. At a broader level, we can observe that scale intensive 
multinationals (SCALE INTENSIVE) prefer the JV contract, while technological leaders in 
the supplier oriented sector (HIGHTECH SUPPLIER DOMINATED) have a clear 
propensity for the integrated solution. This is not surprising, since scale economies are 
often associated with large companies, characterized by strong bargaining power, whereas 
supplier dominated firms are generally smaller and might have problems avoiding IAs 
spillover.  
Among the country variables included in our regressions
9, it is interesting to see that 
manufacturing operations in Shanghai (SHANGHAI) tend to be conducted via FDI, while 
the opposite is true for JIANGSU, GUANGDONG and ZEHIJANG. No evidence has been 
found related to the dimension of the home country (POP), while the level of national 
R&D Expenditure (RDE) and the percentage of high tech exports (HTE) proved to play 
some role, the former pushing towards FDI, the latter towards JV, although the marginal 
effect is very low, compared to core variables




                                                 
9 Other country variables (not shown) were included in our econometric tests but, given the geographical 
proximity and the economic similarity of Italy, Spain and Switzerland, they resulted insignificant, because 
of the lack of cross country variation. 
10Notice that Spain is the country with the lowest level of high tech exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports, in our sample, and indeed it shows the wicker tendency towards joint-venture 
establishment.   17
Table 2: Probit estimates
11 
    FDI FDI  FDI  FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
GRADUATE  0,181 
(0,022)**   
0,166 




(0,071)*    
0,155 
(0,069)*    
0,170 
(0,050)*    
0,159 
(0,062)*    
0,159 
(0,070)*    







(0,035)**       0,395 
(0,004)***  
0,319 
(0,022)**   
0,351 
(0,017)**   
HIGHTECH        0,119 
(0,090)*                  
TELECOM           0,382 
(0,060)**   
0,354 
(0,085)*           0,405 
(0,043)**   
PATENT  0,070 
(0,045)**       0,054 
(0,098)*       0,118 
(0,029)**          0,125 
(0,032)**   
PATENT*HIGHTECH           0,127 
(0,026)**               
PATENT/SALES     0,454 
(0,002)***               0,406 
(0,013)**      
EMPLOY        0,026     
(0,683)             -0,009 
(0,176)       
SALES        -0,020 
(0,449)          -0,003 
(0,288)          
HFDI        -0,129 
(0,051)*   
-0,122 
(0,099)*    
-0,148 
(0,039)**       -0,138 
(0,051)*       
COUNTRIES                    -0,312 
(0,002)***     
METAL        0,220 
(0,082)*   
0,281 
(0,022)**   
0,289 
(0,018)**       0,305 
(0,017)**   
0,279 
(0,022)**   
PRECISION              0,346 
(0,073)*             
SCALE INTENSIVE        -0,217 
(0,078)*          -0,238 
(0,096)*        -0,234 
(0,073)*    
HT SUPPLY 
DOMINATED                 0,456 
(0,001)***      0,437 
(0,001)***  
SPAIN                 0,500 
(0,001)***        
SHANGHAI           0,370 
(0,000)***  
0,351 




JIANGSU                 -0,361 
(0,000)***      -0,232 
(0,080)*    
GUANGDONG                 -0,228 
(0,011)**         
ZEHIJANG              -0,244 
(0,081)*    
-0,274 
(0,048)**   
-0,268 
(0,046)***     
POP                      0,034 
(0,282)    
RDE                0,046 
(0,019)**         
HTE          -0,051 
(0,085)**   
-0,057 
(0,057)*             
Obs  236  234  234  236  236  257  234  236 
p-value  0,000***  0,000***  0,000***  0,000***  0,000***  0,000***  0,000***  0,000*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.0916  0.0708  0.1586  0.1962  0.1981  0.2116  0.2117  0.2405 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper is an attempt to explore the FDI/joint-venture choice of Italian, Spanish and 
Swiss multinationals in China, as shaped by the risk of dissipating their Intangible Assets. 
                                                 
11 Marginal effects and P-value in round brackets shown. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. 
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By telling the tale of these countries, we intended to document their experience in the 
PRC, and discuss to what extent the DIA approach can be applied to the FDI/JV trade-off, 
adding to the traditional FDI/licensing one. 
Basing on survey data, our estimates show that Foreign Direct Investment is the most 
preferred mode of entry for European firms endowed with superior technology and higher 
skilled employees, meaning that the threat of knowledge spillover not only drives their 
choice of total versus partial ownership, but it also plays a major role in orienting such a 
decision, compared to home country characteristics. Put another way, irrespective of their 
origin, parent firms characterized by a higher degree of IAs show a clearer preference for 
total ownership, to secure their resources against a potential Chinese partner. These 
results are completely aligned with the theoretical predictions derived for the standard 
comparison between FDI and licensing (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Markusen 1998, 
2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and 
Saggi 2002a). 
We believe that these findings, although preliminary, are promising enough to encourage 
further research on joint-ventures within the DIA field: in theoretical terms, future steps 
should include the creation of a model to incorporate the JV among the contractual 
arrangements that MNEs can sign when entering into a foreign market; in empirical 
terms, further evidence is also needed to add a multiple-host country perspective and 
control for possible selection bias. 
   19
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